NSWCA: Chorley Exception May Extend to Barristers
In the matter of Pentelow v Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 150, the New South Wales Court of Appeal was required to consider whether the ‘Chorley exception’ applies to barristers as well as to solicitors. The Chorley exception is an exception to the well-established rule that a self-represented litigant is not entitled to professional costs for acting for him or herself in legal proceedings and provides that self-represented litigants who are solicitors are entitled to recover professional costs for work they have undertaken in legal proceedings.
In doing so, the court was also required to consider whether, if the exception did apply, it would extend to include circumstances in which barristers had engaged legal representation to act on their behalf in the relevant proceeding.
Background
The case involved Janet Pentelow, a barrister who brought proceedings in both the Local Court and Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking to recover unpaid fees following a dispute with her client (who had been her instructing solicitors). Although the Supreme Court awarded costs in Ms Pentelow’s favour in respect of both proceedings, the cost assessor later rejected in its entirety that part of the costs claimed by Ms Pentelow for preliminary work that she had undertaken herself prior to engaging legal representation, such as drafting the originating process and her affidavit of evidence.
During a subsequent review by the Costs Review Panel, Ms Pentelow’s claim for costs relating to work that she had undertaken was again disallowed on the on the basis that Ms Pentelow was not self-represented as she was represented by solicitors and senior counsel in the prior proceedings, and on the basis that the Chorley exception did not extend to barristers. Ms Pentelow subsequently appealed to the District Court of New South Wales, however was unsuccessful on the same basis and thus sought judicial review of the decision pursuant to s69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).
Here, the New South Wales Court of Appeal was required to consider the following grounds:
- Whether the Chorley exception extends to barristers;
- Whether Ms Pentelow was a self-represented litigant; and
- Whether the Chorley exception applied to Pentelow in circumstances where she engaged legal representatives but also undertook legal work herself.
Whether the Chorley exception applies to barristers
In contending that the Chorley exception applies to self-represented barristers, Ms Pentelow submitted that the court must have regard to the underlying rationale for the rule. In doing so, Ms Pentelow contended that as a barrister’s costs are able to be quantified by the same processes by which a solicitor’s costs are, they too should fall within the ambit of the Chorley exception.
Beazley ACJ (with whom Macfarlan JA agreed) accepted this submission, ultimately concluding that as there was no binding authority, it was appropriate to consider the rationale for the exception. Ultimately, her Honour determined that the Chorley exception extended to the work undertaken by a self-represented barrister, so long as that work was not expressly proscribed by the Bar Rules. Significant in Beazley ACJ’s reasoning was the fact that there was now significant overlap in the work undertaken by both solicitors and barristers and the costs of each may be assessed under the same costs assessment processes. It is important to note that the costs of solicitors and barristers are also assessed under the same costs assessment processes in Queensland and other jurisdictions in Australia, as well as New South Wales.
Whether Ms Pentelow was a self-represented litigant
The court identified that in order to be entitled to relief by way of judicial review, the applicant must establish error of law or jurisdictional error because a question of fact was not amenable to judicial review. In doing so, it held that this ground failed on the basis that it sought to challenge a finding of fact and thus, was not amenable to judicial review.
Whether the Chorley exception applied to Ms Pentelow in circumstances where she engaged legal representatives but also undertook legal work herself
In determining the final ground, Beazley ACJ (with whom Macfarlan JA agreed) concluded that despite having engaged legal representation, Ms Pentelow was entitled to recover costs for legal work she undertook herself. Her Honour held that this issue raised a question of mixed fact and law, which was amenable to judicial review. Ultimately, her Honour concluded that Ms Pentelow’s entitlement to recover specific items of costs claimed was a matter for costs assessment and the matter was remitted to the District Court of New South Wales and the Costs Review Panel for that purpose.
Conclusion
This case highlights an interesting facet of law in that it was found that the costs of self-represented barristers undertaking legal work not otherwise proscribed by the Bar Rules fall within the Chorley exception. Given the criticism that the Chorley exception and its underlying rationale has drawn in recent times, it will be interesting to note how the High Court will handle such matters that emerge in future cases.
NSWCA: Voluntary Administrator Lawful in Terminating Rabbi’s Employment
In a recent matter before the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the court was required to determine whether the Voluntary Administrator of the South Head Synagogue acted lawfully in terminating the employment of Chief Rabbi Benzion Milecki. In doing so, they were required to consider whether Orthodox Jewish Law (Halakah) could be incorporated into Australian Law, thus meaning that the Rabbi’s appointment was for life.
The case ensued after the Synagogue was placed into administration in 2017, following which the administrator immediately terminated the Rabbi’s employment contract and later prohibited him from attending the synagogue.
Rabbi Milecki consequently brought proceedings against the administrators, claiming that Hazakah (life tenure) was a term of the contract, and that the purported termination of his employment was not permitted.
At first instance, the termination of Rabbi Milecki’s employment was found to be unlawful, with Justice Bereton concluding that Hazakah was incorporated, or alternatively implied, as a term of the contract. However, on appeal, the court unanimously found the administrator was acting within the law by terminating the contract.
In finding against the Rabbi, the court held that “It was not a term of the respondent’s contract of engagement with the second appellant that his appointment as rabbi could not be terminated otherwise than in accordance with the halachic or Orthodox Jewish legal principle of Hazakah.”
The appeal judges ruled that Halakah could apply to congregation but not to the company. Accordingly, as Australian law was found to apply, in which all employees are terminated when a company is placed into administration, Rabi Milecki’s termination was ultimately deemed lawful. He was subsequently ordered to pay the administrators costs.
Court Awards Liquidators Unfair Preference Payments
In the matter of Trenfield v HAG Import Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd the court was required to consider whether the liquidators of Lineville Pty Ltd were entitled to recover a number of payments as preferences pursuant to s588FA of the Corporations Act 2001 Cth. The payments in question were made by Lineville to HAG Import Corporation, with HAG disputing the liquidator’s entitlement to the payments on the basis that they were not made in respect of an unsecured debt. In doing so, HAG argued that the payments were amounts paid for goods which had been supplied to the company on terms granting HAG a security over the goods or the proceeds of sale of those goods, and that the value of HAG's security was in excess of the amount paid.
In reaching a conclusion, the court was required to consider:
- Whether the security interest had been perfected;
- Whether the creditor was a secured creditor, and if so, at what point in time; and
- How any security was to be valued
Had the Security Interest Been Perfected?
The court applied s267 of the PPSA which provides that correct registration of a security interest prevents the security from vesting in a liquidator or administrator if the company goes into external administration. Here, the registration was not valid for the purposes of the PPSA and thus upon appointment of the administrators, any security interest held by HAG vested in Lineville. In delivering its verdict, the court held that the security interest had not been perfected as it had incorrectly been identified as ‘transitional’.
Despite this, the court ultimately contended that the unperfected security interest was still effective between the parties. In doing so, it held that the PPSA does not make an unregistered security interest completely void.
When Did the Creditor Become Secure?
The court held that the relevant time for determining whether the debt was unsecured is pursuant to the time of each payment. In doing so, it applied s588FA (2) of the Corporations Act, contending that the security has to be valued at the date of each particular payment, in order to perform the calculation required by subsection (2).
How Any Security Was To Be Valued?
After much consideration as to how the value of the security was to be determined, the court held that it was to be assessed as the value of the security to the creditor. Relevantly, it held that in circumstances where there was no expert evidence as to the appropriate basis to value the goods, the matter must be resolved as a matter of common sense. Accordingly, the court held that the appropriate way to value the stock held by the company is at the wholesale price.
Concluding Judgement
Ultimately, judgement was handed down in favour of Lineville, with HAG ordered to pay its liquidators $473,291 plus interest pursuant to s58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011. However, in determining the period for which interest will accrue, the court contended that HAG must be allowed a reasonable time after the demand was made by the liquidators before interest begins to run. According to the statement of claim admitted by the HAG, the first letter of demand was sent on 7 August 2014, and further letters of demand were sent on 3 December 2014, 18 February, 30 April, 17 July and 28 September 2015. It was thus held that interest was payable from 7 August 2015, 12 months after the first letter of demand.
New Laws Introduce GST Withholding Obligations for Residential Property Purchasers
Next week the Treasury Laws Amendment Act (2018 Measures No.1) 2018 (Cth) will come into effect, imposing new GST withholding obligations on purchasers of certain residential real property. The new measures have been designed to prevent property developers from intentionally avoiding their GST obligations, after a spate of incidents in recent times.
From July 1, purchasers of new residential premises or potential residential land will be required to remit the GST payable on the supply directly to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The payment will be due on or before the day on which any part of the consideration for the supply is provided, with this usually occurring at settlement. Relevantly, suppliers of residential land or potential residential land will be required to notify purchasers in writing if they are required to withhold an amount, what that amount is and when it is due to be paid. Failure to do so is a strict liability offence. Individuals who fail to provide the required notice may be fined 100 penalty units (currently $21 000), whilst corporations will be liable to a maximum of 500 penalty units (currently $105 000).
Generally, where a vendor makes a taxable supply of new residential premises or potential residential land, the purchaser will be required to withhold 1/11th of the price and pay it directly to the ATO.
However, there are some situations in which the amount to be withheld must be calculated differently.
Margin Scheme Sales
Where a property is sold under a margin scheme, the purchaser will be required to pay 7% of the contract price or price.
Mixed Supply Sales
Where a property is a mixed-supply, that is partly GST-free and partly taxable, a purchaser must pay the ATO 10% of the GST exclusive market value of the supply.
Sales with low or no consideration
The amount payable will be reduced and calculated using a reasonable apportionment of the contract price or price multiplied by the applicable rate.
Sales involving multiple purchasers
Where a sale involves multiple purchasers, who are not joint tenants, the amount to be paid will be; 7% as in the case of margin schemes, 1/11th of the contract price, or the price for their percentage of interest in the property purchased.
De Facto Director Ordered to Compensate Unpaid Supplier Following Insolvent Trading
Tremco Pty Ltd ACN 000 024 064 v Thomson & Ors [2018] QDC 101
Case Facts
The plaintiff (Tremco) was the principle supplier of waterproofing materials to a waterproofing business (Kadoe). The defendant (Thomson) was the wife of the formally appointed director of this business. In this proceeding, Tremco sought to recover compensation from the wife under s 588M(3) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for losses suffered in relation to unpaid debts.
The debt arose from unpaid invoices beginning in March 2010. In November 2010, the defendant’s account was put on hold. By December 2010, the amount owing to the plaintiff totalled $146,410.20.
In 2015 Tremco brought proceedings against Kadoe for the outstanding debts and obtained a judgment in their favour. Subsequently, Kadoe failed to comply with a statutory demand based on the judgement and was wound up in insolvency on 29 April 2015. The defendant’s husband was made bankrupt in June 2015. Tremco sought compensation for the expenses incurred in this process.
Legal Principles
Section 588M(1) sets out several conditions which must be satisfied before compensation under section 588M(3) can be recovered. The condition in dispute in this case was s 588M(1)(a), which imposes a requirement that, in order to recover compensation, a person (a director) has contravened s 588G(2) or (3) in relation to the incurring of a debt by a company. The key question was therefore whether the defendant was a director within the meaning of director as defined in s 9 of the Act during the alleged period of insolvent trading.
Tremco argued that the defendant was a de facto director of the company due to her involvement in the setting up of the company in 2009 and subsequent management position in the company. The defendant disputed this claim arguing that the company was supposed to be incorporated as a trust. The defendant’s argument was that the setting up of the trust had failed and hence the company had not been trading in its own right.
In support of their claim that the defendant was a de facto director, Tremco pointed to several factors. First, that by the defendants own account, she had been responsible for setting up the Company and the Trust. Second that the defendant had significant involvement and control over the day to day operations of the business including a self-identification as the ‘General Manager’.
In response to Tremco’s assertions, the defendant argued that she had only been a conduit on behalf of her husband in setting up the trust and in any event the incorporation of the trust had failed. In regard to her involvement the defendant relied on the case of Re Swan Services Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 1724, arguing that her role was only as wife who became involved in the affairs of the company to address the emergency of the invalidity of the Trust. This claim was rejected on the basis that her involvement went far beyond emergency assistance and involved conducting the dispute over the alleged invalid trust for the Company over many years.
Decision
Porter DCJ QC held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for loss or damage under s 588M. His Honour found that the defendant was a de facto director of the company at all times due to the system of shared management; the husband was responsible for onsite activities whilst the wife was responsible for the operational and administrative affairs of the company. His Honour, in reference to the authority of Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 287 ALR 22, noted the presence of several factors leading to this decision:
- the defendant had independent authority to negotiate and manage matters of importance on behalf of Kadoe and could go further and bind Kadoe in relation to those matters;
- The defendant’s husband had little, if any, oversight or involvement in those matters and largely left executive decision making to her in many areas.
With the question of the defendants status settled, his Honour found that the defendant was in a position to determine the solvency of the business and had reasonable grounds to suspect the company was insolvent during the relevant time period.
Federal Court: Gated Housing Renders Personal Service Impractical
In the recent case of bCode Pty Ltd (in liq) v Holford [2018] FCA 798 the court was required to consider whether an order for substituted service may be granted where multiple attempts to personally serve a notice have been unsuccessful.
The case involved bCode, a mobile technology company, who had unsuccessfully attempted to serve documents on Troy Holford on numerous occasions. Mr Holford lived within a gated community in Sanctuary Cove. The community was monitored by a security team, and thus in order to gain access to Mr Holford’s residence, one was required to first contact the security team via intercom, who was to then contact the residence for access approval.
During the trial, Mr Russ, a commercial agent for bCode, gave evidence that on four occasions, he attempted to serve notice at the Sanctuary Cove address. Specifically, Mr Russ contended that on the first occasion, the guard told him that Mr Holford was abroad, however gave permission for Mr Russ to enter the premises and leave the documents with his son. Mr Russ declined this offer on the basis that he was required to personally serve the notice on Mr Holford.
When he returned a third time, Mr Russ once again contacted the security guard who subsequently phoned Mr Holford’s premises and spoke with a woman, who informed him that Mr Holford was still overseas. Mr Russ notified the guard that he now had authorisation to leave the documents with a resident at the address, however when the guard called back, there was no answer at the premises. On both other occasions Mr Russ was notified that there was no answer at Mr Holford’s address.
In considering bCode’s application, the court was required to determine whether personal service was ‘not practicable’ pursuant to r10.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. In doing so, the Gleeson J contended ‘that it is impracticable to effect personal service on Mr Holford since he resides in a secure housing estate where access is only permitted by security guards authorised by a resident’.
The court also heard evidence from bCode’s solicitor Laura Scotten, who verified that; Mr Holford is the owner of the Sanctuary Cove address, that his address in ASIC records is the Sanctuary Cove address and that he is the director and shareholder of Holford Properties Pty Ltd, which lists its principal place of business as at the Sanctuary Cove address. Ms Scotten also gave evidence that in late February 2018, Mr Holford had sent emails from a known email address.
According to this information, Gleeson J submitted that pursuant to the Federal Court Rules 2011, it was appropriate to substitute an alternate method of service. It was ultimately held that notice may been served on Mr Holford by post to the Sanctuary Cove address and by transmitting the documents to his email. Her Honour contended that the documents will be taken to be served seven days thereafter.
Federal Budget Introduces Anti-Phoenixing Measures
In the recent federal budget, the Government has vowed to combat illegal phoenix activity by reforming existing corporations and tax laws and granting the Australian Taxation Office additional power. Accordingly, the proposed changes are credited as complementing the work of the Government’s Phoenix, Serious Financial Crime and Black Economy taskforces, with Federal Treasurer Scott Morrison asserting they will ensure small businesses “don’t get ripped off by other businesses who deliberately go bust to avoid paying their bills.”
Illegal phoenixing occurs when a company’s directors allow a business to collapse in order to avoid paying creditors, either through directors resigning or through the business going into administration. All too often the practice results in customers not receiving goods or services they have paid for, lost payments for small businesses and lost wages and entitlements for affected employees. Ultimately, it has an adverse impact on the economy, with illegal phoenix operators gaining an unfair advantage over honest businesses.
Under the proposed budget, the government has allocated $40million to be spent over the next four financial years, introducing new phoenix offences to target those who conduct or facilitate illegal phoenixing. Specifically, these measures endeavour to prevent directors from backdating their resignations, limiting the ability of directors to resign and restricting the ability of related creditors to appoint or remove external administrators.
Moreover, it will expand the ATO’s power to retain refunds where there are outstanding tax lodgements and will extend the Director Penalty Regime to include GST, luxury car tax and wine equalisation tax, making directors personally liable for the company’s debts.
England: Court Upholds Rock Solid Contract
Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited [2018] UKSC 24
The Supreme Court has held that a clause in a contract, which required modifications to that contract be in writing and signed by both parties, invalidated a subsequent oral agreement to vary the contract. Specifically, the issue before the court was whether the No Oral Modification (NOM) clause was legally effective.
Background
Rock Advertising entered into a licence with MWB to occupy office space for a fixed term of 12 months. The licence contained a clause requiring all variations to be set out in writing and signed on behalf of both parties.
However, it was later agreed that the payment schedule would be varied. Despite this, MWB treated the variation as merely a proposal and rejected the new schedule before excluding Rock Advertising from the premises for failing to pay the arrears. Ultimately, MWB terminated the licence.
At first instance, the County Court found that the oral agreement did not satisfy the formal requirements of the NOM Clause. The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the decision, holding that the oral variation amounted to an agreement to dispense with the NOM clause. MWB consequently brought proceedings to the Supreme Court.
The case focused on whether the agreement to vary the payment schedule was effective, despite being in breach of the requirements of the NOM clause.
Decision
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision, unanimously holding that the absence of the writing and signatures required by the NOM clause rendered the oral agreement to vary the contract invalid. In doing so, Lord Sumption found that the proper understanding of party autonomy is that parties may agree to bind their future conduct, however that agreement will be definitive. Consequently, as the contract stipulated that variations to the contract were to be in writing, the oral variation was deemed invalid.
In this instance, Rock Advertising argued that MWB acted on the agreement and that the doctrine of estoppel should therefore apply to prevent unfairness. Specifically, they contended that MWB should not be able to rely on the NOM clause to invalidate the oral variation. However, the court ruled that estoppel did not arise on the facts of this case.Rather, the court held that for estoppel to arise, there needed to be evidence of words or conduct which unequivocally represented the variation as valid, and that it needed to be something more than the informal promise itself.
Business Implications
This case serves as a timely reminder for businesses whose contracts are governed by English law, that they should seek to ensure all stakeholders are aware that informal and oral variations to contracts containing NOM clauses will not be enforceable. They should also note that the defence of estoppel may be difficult to establish and should be careful to follow the strict provisions of any NOM clause.
Ultimately, it provides that where a contract contains a NOM clause, the parties can be certain that the written contract represents the contract in entirety.
Federal Government to Introduce Harsher Penalties for White-Collar Crime
In the wake of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, the Federal Government has announced it will crack down on penalties for corporate misconduct. In doing so, it has accepted the majority of recommendations made by the Senate Economics References Committee and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Enforcement Review Taskforce reports, with harsher penalties to apply to both directors and corporations who have breached their duties.
Relevantly, ASIC infringement notices will also be expanded to cover a broader range of financial services and managed investments infringement.
The amendments will also introduce new maximum penalties.
For Individuals:
- the greater of 5,000 penalty units (currently $1.05 million);or
- three times the value of the benefits obtained or losses avoided; and
For Corporations:
- greater of 50,000 penalty units (currently $10.5 million); or
- three times the value of the benefits obtained; or
- Losses avoided, or 10% of annual turnover in the 12 months before the misconduct, up to a total of one million penalty units ($210 million).
The proposed changes signal a significant reform of current legislation, in which the maximum civil penalty for individuals is $200 000, and $1million for corporations.
Whilst individuals and corporations who are found to have breached their duties must be held accountable, in upholding the rule of law, it is equally important that individuals and corporations are made aware of the impending amendments.
Court Rules Against Setting-Off Unfair Preference Claim
In the recent case of Stone v Melrose Cranes & Rigging Pty Ltd, in the matter of Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) the Federal Court was required to determine whether a set-off was available to Melrose Cranes, pursuant to s 553C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
Here, the liquidators of CPS submitted that $308 544.58 worth of payments made to Melrose Cranes constituted unfair preferences.
In defending the claim, Melrose Cranes unsuccessfully raised the defence of 'good faith', the doctrine of ultimate effect and the 'running account' defence, before asserting an entitlement to set off $80 774.23, pursuant to s553C of the Act. In supporting this claim, Melrose Cranes maintained that this figure represented the amount CPS was indebted to it at the date of the appointment of the administrators.
The liquidators urged the Court not to adopt this view, arguing that setting-off should not be available in the context of preference claims. In doing so, they contended that the application of existing case law including Re Parker was 'plainly wrong' in this context as it related to setting-off voidable transaction claims and not preference claims. Ultimately, they argued that applying such cases here would be contrary to the statutory purpose of the Act.
However, the court upheld the finding of Re Parker, contending that a set-off in section 553C applies to voidable transaction claims, including unfair preference claims.
The liquidators subsequently relied on s553C(2) to argue that setting-off is expressly prohibited where a person has notice of a company's insolvency, and thus was not available to Melrose Cranes. The Court agreed, concluding that Melrose Cranes had notice of the company's insolvency at the time it gave credit in respect of the outstanding indebtedness.
In reaching this conclusion, the court submitted that a person will have notice of a company's insolvency if, pursuant to s95, the person has actual notice of the facts that indicate the company lacks the ability to pay its debts when they fall due.
Accordingly, Markovic J rejected Melrose Cranes' application to have the proposed sum set-off on the basis that it was "clear that a reasonable person in Melrose Cranes' circumstances would have had grounds for suspecting insolvency at the time of each of the transactions."
