UK case reignites debate on the correct extent of judicial intervention
A recent decision in the United Kingdom has shed light on the topical issue surrounding the proper extent of judicial intervention. The case of Serafin v Malkiewicz & Ors [2019] EWCA Civ 852 ensued after Mr Serafin appealed an earlier decision on a number of grounds, including that the trial judge had exercised unfair judicial treatment against him.
Mr Serafin was a Polish immigrant who relocated to London where he subsequently engaged in a number of small business ventures, including a food business, which he launched in 2008. In 2011, a bankruptcy order was issued in relation to that business, with the Official Receiver finding Mr Serafin had engaged in misconduct by disposing of £123,743 whilst insolvent. As a result, Mr Serafin was made subject to a five-year Bankruptcy Restrictions Undertaking (BRU) in 2012.
In October 2014, Mr Serafin was the subject of an article published in Nowy Czas, a magazine popular among London’s Polish community. The article was entitled ‘Bankruptcy Need Not Be Painful’ and Mr Serafin contended that it contained serious defamatory allegations about him that amounted to a character assassination. He subsequently brought an action against the magazine’s editor and co-publishers, complaining of 14 different defamatory allegations.
The matter was heard over a 7-day period, after which Justice Jay found that many of the allegations were in fact ‘seriously defamatory’. Despite this, his Honour dismissed the claim in its entirety after finding some of the allegations to be untrue. Mr Serafin subsequently appealed the decision on five grounds, including that the trial judge had shown him ‘unfair judicial treatment’.
On appeal, counsel for Mr Serafin asserted that the judge’s interventions were accusatory, with the judge acting as an advocate for the defendant’s case rather than a neutral umpire. Mr Serafin also argued that the judge ought to have considered that there was an inherent risk of unfairness on the basis that he was an unrepresented litigant who was not legally qualified and did not have English as a first language, whilst his opponent was a very experienced silk.
In doing so, Mr Serafin tendered evidence that Justice Jay had formed a prejudicially adverse view of his evidence and character. The evidence included comments made by his Honour that Mr Serafin was “fundamentally untrustworthy” and warning Mr Serafin that “you will lose” and “I will hold things against you.” His Honour also told Mr Serafin “your reputation is already starting to fall apart, because you are a liar and you do treat women in a frankly disgraceful way.”
Furthermore, when counsel for the defendants suggested that the judge ask Mr Serafin which parts of the article he maintained were false, Justice Jay quipped, “I would not even bother, Mr Metzer, I think we have got to assume every point is lies.”.
On appeal, the court held that it was wrong for Justice Jay to “descend into the arena and give the impression of acting as an advocate”. In doing so, it concluded that it was “immediately apparent…that the Judge’s interventions during the Claimant’s evidence were highly unusual and troubling” and that his Honour “used language which was threatening, overbearing, and frankly, bullying”.
In deliberating this ground, the court considered Michel, which notes that not all departures from good practice render a trial unfair. However, having regard to the ‘nature, tenor and frequency of the Judge’s interventions’, the court concluded that an appeal was warranted.
In allowing the appeal, the court declared that Justice Jay “not only seriously transgressed the core principle that a judge remains neutral during the evidence, but he also acted in a manner which was, at times, manifestly unfair and hostile to the Claimant”.
Ultimately, this case reinforces that the role of a judge is to determine the dispute of the parties impartially and that one should not engage in bullying or unnecessary intervention. Although a UK case, it reflects trends in the Australian legal system, with almost two thirds of Victorian barristers reported to have been bullied from the bench. The rising number of instances such as this certainly begs the question of whether Queensland ought to create a Judicial Commission as has been done in New South Wales.
The scope of judicial intervention is a complex topic, which requires an open debate.
Failure to Disclose Debt May Jeopardise Consent Order
A recent finding of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia serves as a timely reminder that a failure to disclose an asset or debt in a consent order may result in orders being set aside, regardless of whether that asset or debt is in the name of an individual, or the name of an ex-partner.
In the matter of Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Hicks & Hicks and Anor [2018] FamCAFC 37, the court was required to determine whether an appeal should be allowed on the basis that the primary judge erred in dismissing an application to set aside consent orders.
Specifically, the case involved Mr and Mrs Hicks, a husband and wife who, during their marriage, had acquired a number of properties between them. Mr Hicks also engaged in a number of business ventures, including a commercial deal to secure a $560,000 investment by Mr S in an enterprise known as U Pty Ltd.
Following their divorce, the couple filed an Application for Consent Orders for property settlement, in which neither party disclosed any liability to Mr S or identified him as a person who may be entitled to become a party to the case - something the application required.
Consequently, the Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate sought to have the final consent orders set aside.
At first instance, Mrs Hicks asserted that although there was a miscarriage of justice, the consent orders should not be set aside. The primary judge found in favour of Mrs Hicks, concluding that the debt was not incurred for a matrimonial objective and thus ruling that she had no involvement in Mr Hicks debt to Mr S. His Honour also contended that the trustee of bankruptcy would find itself in no better position if the order were set aside.
At trial, the Trustee subsequently argued that the consent orders should be set aside. In doing so, the Trustee asserted that the parties to the consent orders had sought to defeat a creditor by not disclosing that Mr S was suing Mr Hicks for $606,000 or notifying Mr S of the orders they proposed.
Thus, the court concluded that the Trial Judge had not taken into account the likely outcome of the property settlement proceedings in the event that the orders were set aside. Ultimately, the court held that the debt of $606,000 was incurred during the marriage and the projects which were linked to the loan were intended to benefit the marriage. On these grounds, the court allowed the appeal, ordering the proceeding be partially remitted for rehearing on the basis that there was a miscarriage of justice pursuant to s79A(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
